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ASYMPTOMATIC HIV UNDER THE ADA: THE
INVISIBLE,YET LEGITIMATE DISABILITY'
INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1990, Congress took a giant step toward equal opportuni-
ties for persons with disabilities by enacting the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA or Act),2 a statute designed to prevent discrimination
and provide certain protections to persons with disabilities.3 Congress
found that there needs to be protections for persons with disabilities be-
cause, as part of a discrete and insular minority, these individuals suffer
from discriminatory treatment and societal stereotypes due to their dis-
abilities.4
The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties.5 Since its enactment, however, many questioned what constitutes a
1. This Comment was drafted before the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998), in which the Court held that an
individual with asymptomatic HIV has a disability under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act. See id. at 2207. This Comment analyzes the law prior to this deci-
sion and aqyues that individuals with asymptomatic HIV, just like those with AIDS,
have a disability. While this Comment applies an analysis similar to the Court's, it
also includes additional arguments for why an asymptomatic individual has a dis-
ability under the ADA. These additional arguments are of particular significance in
light of the Supreme Court's statement that there may be other grounds upon which
asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the ADA. See id. at 2205.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The Act is divided into the follow-
ing titles: Title I - employment discrimination, Title II - state and local government
services, Title III - public accommodations, Title IV - telecommunications, and
Title V -retaliation and coercion. See JOHN PARRY, REGULATION, LITIGATION
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 2
(1996).
3. S;ee 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630 (1998). The ADA is compared to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 because its purpose is to provide persons with disabilities the
same employment opportunities available to others; however, unlike the Civil
Rights Act, which prohibits attention to personal characteristics, the ADA requires
employers to determine if there is a way to "remove the barrier" caused by the
disability. :ee id
4. See42 U.S.C. § 12101(a); see also PARRY, supra note 2, at 2.
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12132, 12182 (1994). The employment section
of the statuite generally states that employers are prohibited from discriminating
against a person who is disabled, but otherwise qualified in the context of "job
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disability due to the broad, and at times, ambiguous wording used to
define a disability.6 One such question arose in the context of Human
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV) infection in regard to individuals
who show no outward symptoms. These individuals are asymptomatic.
The issues surrounding whether asymptomatic HIV is a disability have
received heightened attention because of the changing aspects of the
HIV virus in recent years. 7 Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), once associated almost exclusively with homosexuals and ille-
gal drug users,8 is becoming increasingly prevalent in every spectrum of
our society.9 The United Nations' AIDS office reports that thirty million
people worldwide have the HIV virus.10 Yet, while more people are
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em-
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." Id § 12112(a) (1994). The ADA lists specific instances when dis-
crimination can occur in this context, which include:
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or em-
ployee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of
such applicant or employee because of the disability of such appli-
cant or employee-...
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration-
(A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability;
or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to
common adininistrative control;...
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodation to the known physi-
cal or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual...
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or em-
ployee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if
such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make
reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments
of the employee or applicant ....
Id. § 12112(b).
6. See id. § 12102(2) (1994); Mark Parenti, Three Years of the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Lessons for Employers, 6 NLCPI WHITE PAPER, No. 1, 1
(Oct. 1995).
7. See JAMES G. FRIERSON, EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 211 (2d ed. 1995).
8. See Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The
Legal Impact of the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 43
n.2 (1997).
9. See Justin Gillis, Ruling Shows How Far Nation Has Evolved on Epi-
demic, WASH. POST, June 26, 1998, at A16.
10. See Geoffrey Cowley, Is AIDS Forever?, NEWSWEEK, July 6, 1998, at
60. The reason for the increase in the total number of cases is not because there
was an increase in the number of new cases diagnosed in recent years, but rather
because persons originally diagnosed are able to live much longer than previously
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contracting the virus, the nature of the virus' impact is changing because
death is no longer imminent." Instead, many people who are HIV-
positive can maintain active lifestyles for years after their initial diagno-
sis and may have no physical symptoms for up to fifteen years.' 2 Be-
cause HIV-positive individuals are becoming more common in the
workforc., it is necessary to determine whether the ADA protects HIV-
positive individuals, especially those without symptoms.
13
The statute on its face does not state whether asymptomatic HIV-
positive individuals are disabled under the ADA. Therefore, one must
look to the legislative history, agency regulations, and case law to inter-
pret the Act. Initially, the federal courts consistently found HIV-positive
individuals, even when asymptomatic, to be disabled under the Act. This
pattern clhanged when the Fourth Circuit found that an asymptomatic
HIV-positive individual had no physical impairment that may be deemed
disabling by the ADA.14 The United States Supreme Court took notice of
the inconsistency in the circuits and granted certiorari to hear arguments
from a case out of the First Circuit, Bragdon v. Abbott,15 thereby ren-
dering the landmark ruling that an individual with asymptomatic HIV
has a disability under the ADA.
16
This Comment analyzes the definition of a disability under the ADA,
focusing on why asymptomatic individuals with the HIV virus qualify as
disabled, independent of the Supreme Court's recent holding. Part I pro-
vides background on the nature of the HIV virus, the Federal Rehabili-
tation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Part II discusses the
pertinent administrative guidelines and federal court decisions address-
ing this issue. Part III considers different approaches to determine
thought. See FRIERSON, supra note 7, at 210.
11. See Parmet & Jackson, supra note 8, at 7.
12. See FRIERSON, supra note 7, at 211. People who are infected with the
HIV virus are now able to live longer and fuller lives after the original diagnosis
because ofthe medication available. See id This means more people are able to
remain in the workforce with the HIV virus. See id.
13. See id. at 210.
14. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 169-70 (4th Cir.
1997).
15. 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997). The Supreme Court listened to arguments limited
to three questions - two of which are relevant to the ADA's protection of asympto-
matic individuals with HIV: (1) Is reproduction a major life activity under the
ADA? (2) Does an asymptomatic individual with HIV have a per se disability in
terms of the ADA? See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 554.
16. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at2213.
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whether such an individual has a disability under the ADA. This section
looks at the elements necessary to find a disability, focusing on whether
there is a physical impairment, whether the virus affects a major life
activity, and whether there is a substantial limitation on that activity.
Additionally, this section discusses when the effects of people's percep-
tions of an individual can render a person disabled. Part IV addresses
whether the ADA protects an asymptomatic individual in light of the
language of the Act, legislative history, congressional intent, federal
court decisions, and the interpretative guidelines promulgated by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ). This Comment concludes that an individual with
the HIV virus, albeit displaying no signs of the disease, is disabled
within the meaning of the term "disability" under the ADA. Due to the
nature of the virus, he or she has a physical impairment that substan-
tially limits a major life activity.
I. BACKGROUND: HIV AND THE ADA
A. HIV Infection
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is the retrovirus that
causes the illness, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).' 7
When HIV infects a person, the virus penetrates and disables white
blood cells within the body.Is Although the virus permeates the body of
an individual, he or she may not show any indication of the illness. 19
There are three different stages that an individual experiences once he
or she has become infected with HIV.20 These stages "form a spectrum
of related conditions" that eventually prove fatal in many instances.
21
During the first stage, when a person is initially infected, he or she gen-
erally will show no outward symptoms. 22 Although an individual is
asymptomatic during this period, he or she can still infect other persons
17. See GLAXO, INC., CARING FOR PATIENTS WITH HIV INFECTION 15
(1989).
18. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (HIV is the
causative agent of AIDS in that it "penetrates and then disables white blood cells
which normally check the growth of parasitic infections in the body.").
19. See FRIERSON, supra note 7, at 211.
20. Seeid at211.
21. See Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 679.
.22. See FRIERSON, supra note 7, at 211.
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with the virus through the exchange of bodily fluids.23 Sexual partners
and unborn children are especially vulnerable to infection. 24 The second
stage of the virus is called AIDS Related Complex (ARC). 2s During this
stage, the individual begins to develop general systemic symptoms.
26
These symptoms can include loss of appetite, fever, weight loss, diar-
rhea, skin rashes, and swollen lymph nodes.2 7 The final stage of the vi-
rus is when the individual develops AIDS.2 8 AIDS causes a person's
immune system to break down, resulting in "infection by a variety of
opportunistic bacterial, fungal, protozoan, and viral pathogens."29 In
simpler terms, the individual is susceptible to diseases that a healthy
person would be able to combat.
B. verview of the Federal Legislation Related to Disabilities
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The first piece of federal legislation enacted by Congress for persons
with disabilities in the workplace was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act).30 This statute prohibited entities from discriminat-
ing against a person due to his or her disability when the individual is
otherwise qualified.31 Unfortunately, the protection provided by the Re-
habilitation Act is limited. The Rehabilitation Act only applies to federal
government agencies and organizations that receive federal funds or





26. See GLAXO, INC., supra note 17, at 14.
27. 4ee FRIERSON, supra note 7, at 211. These symptoms, which are com-
monly asso,-iated with other diseases, are more severe when associated with AIDS.
See id
28. 6ee Id
29. GLAXO, INC., supra note 17, at 13. Common symptoms associated with
AIDS are persistent cough and fever, shortness of breath, as well as blotches and
bumps on skin. See FRIERSON, supra note 7, at 212.
30. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1994).
31. See id § 794. The Rehabilitation Act refers to disabled persons as
"handicapped." A "handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act is exactly the same
thing as a "disability" under the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.1 (1998).
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 794. Section 504 of the Act provides that,
[nic, otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the par-
1998]
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2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
In order to expand the limited protection given to individuals with
disabilities, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in
1990.33 The ADA broadened the protections that persons with disabili-
ties receive by increasing the scope of entities covered. All employers
with fifteen or more employees, places of public accommodations, and
public entities are included under the Act. 34 The ADA does not override
the Rehabilitation Act; rather, it builds on it.35 Because the ADA extends
the reach of those who must abide by the Rehabilitation Act, all sources
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act apply to the ADA as well.
36
Under the ADA, employers and public entities are prohibited from
discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability."" Such a
qualified individual with a disability is a person who can perform the
essential requirements of a position or activity with or without reason-
able accommodations or modifications. 38 The ADA likewise extends this
prohibition against discrimination based on an individual's disability to
places of public accommodations. 39 Anyone who owns, leases, or oper-
ates a public accommodation cannot discriminate against an individual
because of a disability "in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any ex-
ecutive agency or by theUnted States Postal Service.
Id § 794(a). See also PARRY, supra note 2, at 1.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The term "Americans" is not meant
to refer only to American. citizens, but includes all employees, even those who are
not citizens of this country. See 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.1(a).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (stating that an employer is a person in-
volved in commerce who has at least fifteen employees for at least twenty weeks
per year); 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (stating that no individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of a disability by anyone who owns, leases, or operates a public
accommodation); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (stating that no public entity shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; 29 U.S.C.
§§ 791-794; PARRY, supra note 2, at 2.
36. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5)(A), 12182(a), 12201; 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a); see also Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Neb. 1993);
PARRY, supra note 2, at 1.
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132; see also Parenti, supra note 6, at 2-3.
38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12131; see also Parenti, supra note 6, at 2-3
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
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services, ficilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.'4
However, the ADA articulates specific defenses to claims of discrimi-
nation. An employer can argue that there would be an "undue hardship"
on the employer to accommodate the individual 4' or that the individual
would be a "direct threat to others." 42 There are similar provisions in the
public accommodations and services subchapter of the ADA.43 An entity
does not have to make modifications or take steps to ensure the inclu-
sion of persons with disabilities when it would "fundamentally alter the
nature of... [the] goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations." 44 In addition, an entity is not required to take steps
that would result in an undue burden.45
For individuals with HIV to be protected under the ADA, they must
be deemed members of a protected class.46 In order for an HIV-positive
individual to be within the class protected by the ADA, he or she must
have a disability as defined in the statute.47 A person has a disability if
his or her situation falls within one of the following three prongs of the
definition of disability: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individ-




41. S e 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Parenti, supra note 6, at 29
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A)). Undue hardship is defined as "an action re-
quiring significant difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A). The ADA
lays out four factors to determine when an accommodation would be an undue
hardship for the employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1211 (10)(B)(i-iv). The factors in-
clude the nature and cost of the accommodation and the overall impact that the
accommodat ion would have on the employer. See id
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). For purposes of the ADA, a direct threat is de-
fined as "significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated
by reasonable accommodation." Id § 12111(3).
43. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A).
44. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
45. See id § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
46. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 164 (4th Cir.
1997).
47. See id at 166; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
1998]
364 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:357
II. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
TERM "DISABILITY"
The controversy over whether the ADA protects a person with HIV
who has no outward symptoms focused on whether such a person has a
disability under the statute. Governmental entities, such as the EEOC
and the DOJ have promulgated regulations to interpret the provisions of
the ADA.49 These regulations help determine who is protected under the
ADA, and more specifically, what is considered a disability under the
Act.5 The regulations give considerable attention to the first prong of
the definition of a disability, whether a person has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits a major life activity:s The regu-
lations divide the first prong into three different subsections.5 2 Each sub-
section must be satisfied in order to qualify as disabled under the first
prong. 3 The first subsection is a physical or mental impairment.5 4 A
physical impairment is defined to include a physiological disorder which
affects the "neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respi-
ratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, diges-
tive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic" body systems.55 The DOJ
regulations expressly list FHV as one of the impairments included in this
definition. 6 The regulations specifically list both symptomatic and
asymptomatic HIV as impairments under the ADA. 7
The second subsection requires that the impairment affect a major life
49. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-1630.16 (1998); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101-36.608
(1998). The EEOC has jurisdiction over Title I - employment, while the DOJ has
jurisdiction over Title III - public accommodations. See also The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1 - 84.56 (1997). The Supreme Court held the HEW regula-
tions as particularly significant in the interpretation of a disability, because at the
time they were promulgated, HEW was the agency "responsible for coordinating
the implementation and enforcement of § 504." Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct.
2196,2202 (1998).
50. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (1998).
51. See id. § 1630.2.
52. See id. § 1630.2(g)-(j).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
54. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
55. Id.
56. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998).
57. See id.
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activity.5 ' "Major life activities" are activities which the average person
can perform "with little or no difficulty."5 9 Although a specific list of
activities is given, the list is not exhaustive. 60 Lastly, under this prong,
the limitatiion of the major life activity must be substantial. 61 In order to
be substantially limited, one of two situations must occur; either the
person cannot perform a major life activity that the average person is
able to perform, 62 or the person is considerably restricted in regard to the
manner, condition, or duration under which he can perform the
activity.
63
Prior to Bragdon v. Abbott, the only United States Supreme Court
decision to address whether an individual has a disability arose under
the Rehabiilitation Act. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
64
the plaintiff was a schoolteacher who was fired when she suffered a re-
lapse of tuberculosis.65 Arline brought an action against the school board
claiming its actions against her violated Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act.66 The Court focused on the fact that in 1974, Congress
amended the definition of the term disability to include a person who
has a recod of an impairment or who is regarded as having an impair-
ment.67 The Court recognized that Congress was concerned with pro-
tecting individuals against the "effects of erroneous but nevertheless
prevalent perceptions about the handicapped.,, 68 Based on this, the Court
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
59. hi § 1630.2(i). These regulations define major life activities to include
the following: "[C]aring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." Id
60. See 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(i).
61. See id. § 1630.20).
62. See id. § 1630.2(j)-(i).
63. See id. § 1630.20)(2). There are certain factors which should be consid-
ered in order to determine whether there is a substantial limitation to a major life
activity. These factors are as follows: "(i) The nature and severity of the impair-
ment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The per-
manent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or
resulting from the impairment." Id.
64. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
65. See id at 276. The plaintiff had been working for Nassau County for
approximately thirteen years at the time she suffered her third relapse of tuberculo-
sis. See id.
66. See id
67. See id. at 279.
68. d.
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found that Arline had a handicap. 69 Although she did not meet the first
prong because she was not suffering from tuberculosis at the time, she
did have a record of an impairment because she had been hospitalized
for her tuberculosis.70 In explaining that the contagiousness of Arline's
illness and the actual impairment to her could not be distinguished, the
Court stressed that contagious diseases can render a person regarded as
disabled because other people perceive the individual as having a dis-
ability.7 1 The Court stated, "Congress acknowledged that society's ac-
cumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicap-
ping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.
Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of public fear and
misapprehension as contagiousness. 72 Based on this decision, it would
seem that any contagious disease, whether symptomatic or asympto-
matic, could render a person disabled.7 3 However, the Court specifically
refrained from answering the question of whether a "carrier of a conta-
gious disease such as AIDS" could have a handicap under the Rehabili-
tation Act.74
Numerous federal circuit and district court decisions addressed the
issue of whether an individual with asymptomatic HIV is disabled.7" The
courts arrived at varying conclusions by analyzing the definition of a
disability and looking to congressional intent.
Under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, numerous courts
found that HIV alone is enough to constitute an actual disability under
the first prong of the definition.76 As early as 1990, the Eleventh Circuit,
69. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.
70. See id.
71. See id at 282.
72. Id. at 284.
73. See Robert A. Kushen, Comment, Asymptomatic Infection with the AIDS
Virus as a Handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
563, 567 (1988).
74. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 282, n.7.
75. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 118
S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 167 (4th
Cir. 1997); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding an indi-
vidual who is HIV-positive has a disability under the "regarded as" prong).
76. See, e.g., Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D. Pa.
1994); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 678 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Abbott, 107 F.3d at
949 (holding that the HIV-positive plaintiff who was asymptomatic had an actual
disability under the statute).
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in Doe v. Garrett,77 found a plaintiff with HIV "handicapped" under the
Rehabilitation Act.78 In this case, the plaintiff was serving in the Navy
when he was informed that he had tested positive for HIV.79 The court
pointed out that the plaintiff did not display any outward symptoms.80
Once the Navy became aware of the plaintiff's condition, it told him that
he could no longer be on active duty.8' The court found that the plain-
tiffs claim. could not succeed under the Rehabilitation Act because uni-
formed military personnel were exempt.8 2 Nevertheless, the court ex-
plicitly stated, "we note that it is well established that infection with
AIDS constitutes a handicap for purposes of the Act.8 3
At approximately the same time as the Garrett decision, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided a
similar issue in Cain v. Hyatt.84 This case involved determining whether
an attorney at a law firm who tested positive for HIV had a disability
under the 'Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). 5 The plaintiff,
Clarence Cain, claimed that his employer discharged him in violation of
the PHRA.8 6 The district court determined that Cain had a physical im-
pairment which substantially limited a major life activity. The nature
77. 903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990).
78. Se id at 1459. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit consists of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
79. See Garrett, 903 F.2d at 1457.
80. See id
81. Se id.
82. Se id. at 1461.
83. Id. at 1459.
84. 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
85. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1990). The Pennsyl-
vania Human Relations Act is a state statute that protects employees from discrimi-
nation based on a non-job-related disability. See id. at 672. It has interpretative
regulations defining a "handicapped or disabled person" as the same definition of a
disability under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 677.
86. See id at 672. The plaintiff, Clarence Cain, was an attorney who had
graduated from the University of Virginia and was in Hyatt's "Fast Track Regional
Partner Program." See id at 673. After working for Hyatt Legal Services for over
a year, Cain. was diagnosed with AIDS. See id at 673-74. After this diagnosis,
Cain informed his immediate supervisor of his condition and several days later he
was fired. See i d at 676. Although Cain had displayed some problems interacting
with clients and other attorneys, his supervisor specifically informed Cain that his
dismissal was not only because of the aforementioned problems, but also because
he had AIDS. See id.
87. See id. at 679.
1998]
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of the HIV infection itself led the court to find that HIV creates a physi-
cal impairment because it "disables white blood cells, including lym-
phocytes," creating a physiological disorder.88 The court then found that
this physical impairment substantially limited a major life activity be-
cause a person with HIV can transmit the infection to his or her off-
spring.8
9
The court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v.
Illinois" for guidance in determining whether reproduction is a major
life activity. In Stanley, the Court recognized reproduction as an essen-
tial and precious right, when it said, "The rights to conceive and to raise
one's children have been deemed 'essential' . . . 'basic civil liberties of
man,'. . . and '[r]ights far more precious ...than property rights."1'
91
Other major life activities that the court found to be affected were the
ability to pursue a career, and interaction or socialization with others.
92
Due to the belief that AIDS is a highly contagious disease, persons who
are HIV-positive are stigmatized. 93 People's fear of an individual with a
contagious disease can be as debilitating as the actual disability.94 In
Cain's case, he lost his job and lost the ability to socialize and interact
with others due to people's fear of the illness.95 Therefore, this physical
impairment caused a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working and interaction with others, as well as reproduction.
96
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania reiterated this point in the ADA
context in Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf.97 As in Cain, the plaintiff was an
attorney on a partnership track.98 Approximately a year and a half after
88. See id
89. See id.
90. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
91. Id. at 651.
92. See Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 680.
93. See id.
94. See id. (quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,
284 (1987)).
95. See id at 680.
96. See id. The court's holding that the plaintiff was substantially limited in
interacting with others satisfies part (c) of the definition of a disability because the
plaintiff was "regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(c)
(1994).
97. 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
98. See id. at 1314. The plaintiff's success at the firm was evident because
his immediate supervisor often praised his performance and he was given a sub-
stantial bonus shortly after he began. See id
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the plaintiff started working for the firm, he discovered he was HIV-
positive.99 The firm started treating the plaintiff differently after sus-
pecting that the plaintiff was infected with HIV. 00 The plaintiff was
effectively fired several months later, although the firm claimed he're-
signed voluntarily. 10' The plaintiff claimed that the firm discharged him
due to his HIV-positive status, thereby violating the ADA.1
0 2
Similar to Cain, the court in Kohn, Nast & Graf held that the plaintiff
had a disability, which resulted in adverse treatment by his employer.
10 3
The court found that a physical impairment existed because EEOC
regulations include hemic and lymphatic disorders as physical impair-
ments.' "After defining a physiological disorder as "an abnormal func-
tioning of the body or a tissue or organ,"'05 the court noted that a person
can have a disability under the definition of the ADA, despite the fact
that others would not consider the individual disabled "in the usual,
common, ly sense of the word."'0 6
The plaintiff in Kohn, Nast & Graf claimed that he was disabled under
the statute because his ability to procreate was substantially limited.1
0 7
The court determined that the plaintiff had a substantial limitation on the
major life activity of procreation by looking to the EEOC regulations on
major life activities.'0 8 The court found that the regulations did not spe-
cifically preclude reproduction as a major life activity. 09 The court used
Cain to support a finding that reproduction could be a major life activ-
ity." 0 Therefore, the plaintiff met his burden of a prima facie case of
discrimination based on a disability."'
The Firs: Circuit decision, Abbott v. Bragdon, 2 strongly supported
99. See id. This is unlike the plaintiff in Cain, who had AIDS when he
was discharged by his employer. See Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 673-74.
100. See Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. at 1315.
101. See id When the plaintiff returned to the firm from a trip, he found
his office locks changed and his belongings in a box. See id
102. See id at 1313.
103. See id at 1321.
104. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998); see also id.
105. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. at 1319.
106. .d
107. See id at 1318.
108. See id. at 1320-21.
109. ,5ee id.
110. ,ee Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. at 1320-21.
111. Yee id.
112. 107 F.3d 934 (Ist Cir. 1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). In this
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these district court holdings in its analysis of asymptomatic HIV as a
disability under the ADA in a non-employment context.113 In this case,
Ms. Abbott visited Dr. Bragdon's office for a dental examination, at
which time she made it known that she was HIV-positive."4 Dr. Brag-
don informed her that she would need to have a cavity filled at the hos-
pital, not his office, due to her condition." 5 Consequently, Ms. Abbott
would need to pay additional fees to the hospital. 1 6 As a result, Ms. Ab-
bott brought a disability discrimination action under the ADA.",
Relying on the definition of a disability under the ADA, the First Cir-
cuit found that an individual with HIV, whether symptomatic or
asymptomatic, has a disability under the Act." 8 Looking to the EEOC
regulations implementing Title III of the ADA," 9 the court found "un-
hesitatingly" that HIV infection, whether or not there are symptoms as-
sociated with it, is a physical impairment under the ADA.
120
The First Circuit found that reproduction is a major life activity and
that Ms. Abbott is substantially limited in reproduction in her individual
situation. 12 1 Applying the plain meaning of "major," the court concluded
that the key to determining what is a major life activity is to look at
what activities are significant to a person. 2 2 Since reproduction is "the
case, the claim is not against an employer, but rather a dentist who operates a pub-
lic accommodation under Title III. See id at 937. According to the ADA, it is
unlawful for a person who operates a place of public accommodation to discrimi-
nate against a person in the enjoyment of "goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations" because of their disability. See 42 U.S.C. §
12182(a) (1994). The same analysis applies as in the employment context to de-
termine whether an individual is disabled. See id. § 12102.
113. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942. The following states comprise the First
Circuit: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island.
See28 U.S.C. §41 (1994).
114. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 937. At the time of the dental appointment,
Ms. Abbott was not manifesting any outward symptoms. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 938.
118. See id. at 942.
119. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 939; see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998).
120. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 939.
121. See id. at 940.
122. See id. The court declined to answer whether it must make a case-by-
case inquiry into the particular import of the major life activity to the individual.
See id at 941.
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source of all life," and a basic right to all persons, it undoubtedly falls
under thi; category. 123 Without question, reproduction is substantially
limited in a person with HIV, as due to the nature of the disease, there is
a risk of transmitting this infection to any offspring. 24 Additionally, the
court referred to legislative history that demonstrates Congress intended
for HIV-positive individuals to be disabled.'
21
The qu, stion of whether an HIV-positive individual has a disability
has largely been analyzed under the first prong of the definition pro-
vided in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. However, there has also
been a question of whether an individual with this infection can qualify
as disabled under the third prong of the definition, when one is regarded
as disabled.
126
The Ninth Circuit answered this question in the affirmative in Gates v.
Rowland.127 Prison inmates who were HIV-positive were separated from
other inmates and were denied opportunities to participate in work pro-
grams. 128 A prison inmate claimed that this adverse treatment violated
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 129 Unlike previous cases dis-
cussed, the Ninth Circuit did not evaluate HIV infection under the first
123. See id
124. See id. at 942. The court had no reservations about finding that a
person with HIV is substantially limited in reproduction, as it said, "No reasonable
juror could conclude that an 8% risk of passing an incurable, debilitating, and in-
evitably fatal disease to one's child is not a substantial restriction on reproductive
activity." Fd Although the risk of transmission to offspring is reduced from
twenty-five percent to eight percent due to AZT therapy, the EEOC guidelines state
that in dete:rmining a disability under the ADA, one should consider the individ-
ual's condition without medication. See id; 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(h) (1998).
125. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942-43 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (III),
at 28 n. 18(11990)). Materials showing legislative intent include a memorandum put
out by the EOJ which stated that individuals with HIV are covered under the Reha-
bilitation Act. See Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the
President (Sept. 27, 1988), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 195, at D-1
(Oct. 7, 198 9) [hereinafter Kmiec Memorandum].
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)-(C) (1994) (stating that an individual
may have a disability when he or she has a record of a disability or is regarded as
being disabled).
127. 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
128. See id. at 1444.
129. See id at 1442. The Ninth Circuit includes the states of Alaska, Ari-
zona, Califcrnia, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Guam, and Ha-
waii. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
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prong of the Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability; rather, it fo-
cused on the third prong, which states that anyone who is regarded as
having a disability is protected under the ADA.
1 30
In Gates, the Ninth Circuit looked first to the holding in Arline which
stated that people's reactions to contagious diseases are just as disabling
as the actual physical effects.13 1 In 1988, the Ninth Circuit had applied
the Arline analysis to a teacher with AIDS, in Chalk v. United States.
3 2
The court in Gates then extended the Chalk decision to hold that HIV
infection itself, without symptoms, is enough to constitute a disability
under the third prong. 33 The court predicated its decision on the basic
premise that it is not the physical effects of a contagious disease on an
individual that cause the disability, but rather the risk of transmission
and the reaction this causes in others. 34 Therefore, the fact that a person
is asymptomatic with a contagious disease does not preclude such an
individual from being disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. 
3
Even though the First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits found that a per-
son with HIV, whether or not symptomatic, is protected under the Reha-
bilitation Act and ADA, not every court found this to be the case.136 The
Fourth Circuit in Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, focused its
attention on the first prong of the ADA's definition of a disability and
concluded that no disability exists for a person who is HIV-positive
when he or she has no outward symptoms 137 The Fourth Circuit's rea-
soning is that such an individual has no physical impairment which sub-
stantially limits a major life activity.1
38
The first Fourth Circuit case on the issue was Ennis v. National Asso-
130. See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446.
131. See id. at 1445-46; School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273,283 (1987).
132. 840 F.2d 701, 704-12 (9th Cir. 1988). See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446
(discussing Chalk v. United States, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988)).
133. See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446.
134. See id.
135. See id
136. See generally Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. and Educ. Radio, Inc., 53
F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995); Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir.
1997) (holding that a plaintiff with asymptomatic HIV does not have a disability
under the ADA).
137. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 167-72.
138. See id. at 169.
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ciation of Business and Educational Radio, Inc. 139 At the time that the
plaintiff, Joan Ennis, was hired by the National Association of Business
and Educational Radio, Inc. (NABER), she adopted a son who was in-
fected with HIV. 40 Ennis was terminated approximately three years later
and she b-rought an action under the ADA against NABER claiming it
discharged her due to her son's HIV-positive status.14
The court decided that to determine whether an individual has a dis-
ability, a case-by-case determination must be made, focusing on the in-
dividual's specific situation. 142 The court determined that no evidence
existed to indicate that Ennis' son had an impairment, nor that he was
substantially limited in any major life activity, as he did not seem to
suffer any ailments which affected his daily activities. 143 This case,
however, did not make a strong statement regarding HIV and the ADA.
The Fourth Circuit held that, assuming arguendo that Ennis' son was
disabled, s;he still could not win on an ADA claim.'" Ennis could not
establish a primafacie case of discrimination in an ADA claim because
she was not meeting the legitimate expectations of NABER.1
45
The Fourth Circuit's definite statement that asymptomatic HIV is not
a disability under the ADA came in the recent case of Runnebaum.
146
139. 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995).
140. See id. at 57.
141. See id. Ennis claimed that the reason she was fired was because
NABER wL afraid its health insurance rates would increase as a result of any
health problems her son might develop in the future due to his HIV infection. See
id. The ADA protects not only the individual who actually has the disability, but
also any individuals who have a relationship or association with a disabled person.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(4), 12182(b)(1)(D) (1994).
142. See Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59. The Fourth Circuit's jurisdiction includes
the states of' Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Vir-
ginia. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
143. See Ennis, 53 F.3d at 60.
144. See id. at 62.
145. See id. at 58, 62. Her inability to meet NABER's expectations was
evident from her supervisor's poor evaluations of her. See id. at 62.
146. 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997). This was a 6-5 decision on an en banc
hearing. See id In the original Fourth Circuit decision, which was vacated De-
cember 3, 1996, the court denied summary judgment for NationsBank because
Runnebaum provided sufficient evidence that he was regarded as being impaired.
See id. The court also stated that Runnebaum met NationsBank's legitimate ex-
pectations, s;o that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was
discriminated against. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 95 F.3d 1285, 1297
(4th Cir. 1996).
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The plaintiff, William Runnebaum, brought suit against NationsBank,
claiming the bank fired him because of his HIV-positive status, thereby
violating the ADA. 147 Runnebaum was initially employed by Nations-
Bank in 1991 as a marketing coordinator, but by the following year had
been promoted to a sales position. 148 Throughout his employment,
NationsBank claimed it was often unhappy with his performance. 149 Al-
though Runnebaum was diagnosed as HIV-positive in 1988, he showed
no symptoms from the infection and none of his colleagues were aware
of his condition until September of 1992, when Runnebaum told a co-
worker. 50 Throughout the rest of 1992, Runnebaum's performance
failed to improve and he was unable to meet expected sales goals.15 In
January of 1993, Runnebaum's supervisor terminated his
employment. 52 His supervisor asserted that Runnebaum's HIV status
was not a factor in her decision; rather, he was fired because of his in-
ability to meet NationsBank's legitimate expectations.
153
The court held that to establish a primafacie case of discrimination in
a wrongful discharge context, a plaintiff must prove four points by a
preponderance of the evidence. 154 First, the plaintiff must be a member
of a protected class. 155 Second, an employer must have discharged the
plaintiff.'56 Third, at the time of discharge, the plaintiff must have been
147. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 163.
148. See id. at 161.
149. See id. at 162. Prior to moving to the sales position, Runnebaum was
documented as engaging in improper behavior, characterized by such conduct as
"unexplained absenteeism, chronic tardiness, and lengthy lunch periods." id at
161. After the move to the sales position, there is evidence that Runnebaum con-
tinued to have performance problems, including his conduct at client meetings. See
id. at 162.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 162-63.
152. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 163.
153. See id. Runnebaum claims that he was not aware that NationsBank
was unhappy with his performance because he did not receive any written or verbal
warnings. See id.
154. See id. at 164 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981)).
155. See id. A member of a protected class in regard to the ADA is any
individual that is protected by the statute. See id. at 165. Those individuals that are
disabled according to the ADA are members of the Act's protected class. Id.
156. See id
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meeting the legitimate expectations of the employer. 57 Finally, the dis-
charge must "raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination."' 5 8
The Fourth Circuit, in holding that Runnebaum did not establish a
primafacie claim of discrimination under the ADA, first looked to the
necessary elements a plaintiff must prove. 159 The court first inquired
whether Runnebaum was a member of a protected class due to a disabil-
ity within the meaning of the ADA.160 Focusing on the first prong of the
definition, the court divided the definition into two parts; physical im-
pairment and substantial limitation on a major life activity.16 1 In ana-
lyzing whether HIV infection constituted a physical impairment under
the ADA, the court interpreted the statutory language of the Act.
162
Since the term, "impairment" was not specifically defined in the ADA,
the court looked to its natural meaning in the dictionary, finding that in
order for something to be impaired, it had to be made worse than it pre-
viously was.1 63 Based on this definition, the court found that a person
who is asymptomatic simply could not be impaired as there are no ad-
verse effects to that individual.'64
Assuming arguendo that an impairment existed, the court moved its
analysis to the second element of the prong. The court looked at whether
there was any major life activity involved which was substantially lim-
ited by the; HIV infection. 16 5 Here again, "major life activity" is not de-
fined in the Act, so the court looked to the dictionary meaning of the
word "major." 166 The court conceded that procreation is a fundamental
157. Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 164.
158. Id
159. See id.
160. See id. at 165.
161. See id. at 167. The court found that there was insufficient evidence
concerning Ihe third prong of the definition - whether Runnebaum was regarded as
having a disability. See id at 173-74.
162. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 167.
163. See id. at 168. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
603 (1986) defines impair as to "make worse by or as if by diminishing in some
material respect," while BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 677 (5th ed. 1981) describes
the term as "to weaken, to make worse, to lessen in power, diminish, or relax, or
otherwise affect in an injurious manner." -See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 168.
164. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 168.
165. See id at 170.
166. See id. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY
718 (1988) defines major as "demanding great attention or concern" and
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1363 (1986) defines it as
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human activity, but hesitated to find either procreation or intimate sex-
ual relations to be major life activities.167 The court reasoned, however,
that even assuming either of these activities is a major life activity,
asymptomatic HIV does not substantially limit the performance of such
activities, as there is nothing inherent in the infection itself which actu-
ally limits these activities.1 68 Rather, it is a person's "conscience or nor-
mative judgment" which keeps him from engaging in these activities .
69
If the person's reaction to his own condition causes a substantial limita-
tion, then the individual has not met the statutory requirement in the
definition.17 0 In other words, a person with HIV who chooses to abstain
from engaging in sexual relations or who chooses not to reproduce be-
cause of the risks involved with both activities is only limited because of
the individual's conscious decision, not any inherent limitation from the
impairment itself.i71 The court concluded that Runnebaum failed to meet
three of his four requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination
under the ADA. He did not establish that he was a member of a pro-
tected class, that he had met the legitimate expectations of his employer,
or that there was a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.
7 2
III. ANALYSIS: THE DEFINITION OF "DISABLED"
UNDER THE ADA
Before the Supreme Court settled the issue in Bragdon v. Abbott, the
federal courts proceeded in opposite directions with equally strong con-
victions. At one extreme lay the Fourth Circuit's decision holding that
an employee with asymptomatic HIV is not protected by the ADA. At
the other extreme was the Ninth Circuit's holding that a patient treated
by a dentist is protected by the ADA, even if she has no outward symp-
toms of the HIV infection. Some courts interpreted the definition nar-
"greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest." Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 170.
167. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 170-71 (citing to Amicus Curiae brief
for EEOC at 17 and Amicus Curiae brief for Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc. at 19-
20).
168. See id at 171-72.
169. See id at 171 (quoting Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 125, at D-1).
170. See id. at 172. In order to meet the requirement of the definition, a
person must show what the court calls a "casual nexus" between the condition and
the limitation, such as when a person who is paralyzed is substantially limited in
his ability to walk due to the paralysis alone. See id.
171. See id.
172. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 175.
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rowly, due to a likely belief that expanding the number of people pro-
tected would be contrary to congressional intent. Other courts, however,
interpreted the definition broadly, thereby increasing the number of in-
dividuals protected under the ADA. The main controversy focused on
whether a person with asymptomatic HIV has an actual disability under
the first prong of the ADA's definition of a disability, requiring a person
to have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity. 73 To determine whether an individual with asymptomatic
HIV has an actual disability, it is necessary to address each aspect of the
definition separately before drawing a conclusion.
A. Physical Impairment
To dete:rmine whether asymptomatic HIV is a physical impairment
under the ADA, the first place to look for guidance is Titles twenty-
eight and twenty-nine of the Code of Federal Regulations. 74 These
regulations were promulgated by the DOJ and the EEOC,
respectively. 175 Although interpretative regulations promulgated by ad-
ministrative agencies and governmental entities may not have the force
and effect of law, they are entitled to some weight due to the agency's
expertise.1 76 The regulations provide that the definition of a physical
impairment includes hemic and lymphatic disorders or physiological
conditions. 177 By the very nature of the illness, HIV infection is an im-
pairment. It affects both the hemic and lymphatic bodily systems by
disabling white blood cells and lymphocytes. 78 Asymptomatic HIV is
the first stage of a "spectrum of related conditions" which may progress
to the symptomatic illness of ARC and then to full-blown AIDS over a
period of time.179 Even if there are no outward symptoms, by its very
nature, HIV produces a physiological'disorder of several bodily systems.
Furthermore, the finding that asymptomatic HIV is included as an im-
pairment in the ADA is strongly supported by the DOJ regulations.
173. See 42 U.S.C § 12202(2)(A) (1994).
174. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1998).
175. See id These regulations are interpretative as neither the DOJ nor the
EEOC has :substantive rulemaking authority. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994); 28
U.S.C. §§ 501-530A (1994).
176. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
177. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
178. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (quoting
Doe v. Dolton Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. I11. 1998)).
179. See Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 679.
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These regulations expressly include HIV infection, both symptomatic
and asymptomatic, in a list of impairments covered under the term.
180
Both the First and the Ninth Circuits applied this regulation in finding
that the asymptomatic plaintiff had an impairment.'
8'
Apart from promulgating regulations, the DOJ sent out a memoran-
dum which provides guidance on Congress' intent regarding the Reha-
bilitation Act. 8 2 The DOJ memorandum stated in very specific terms
that HIV-infected individuals, both symptomatic and asymptomatic, are
protected under the Act.18 3 The DOJ based its decision on statements
made by the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service at that time,
Dr. C. Everett Koop.8l4 Dr. Koop stated that HIV and the various stages
of the condition are all part of one disease that may begin without any
visible symptoms. 85 Even though the initial stage may not include any
outward symptoms, most people experience "detectable abnormalities of
the immune system,'18 6 constituting an impairment because the virus
180. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1)(iii). There is also a list of impairments
provided which do not fall under the ADA, including such conditions related only
to psychological, environmental, economic, cultural backgrounds, as well as simple
personality or physical characteristics, such as eye or hair color. See 29 C.F.R.
App. § 1630.2(h). Specific illnesses listed which do not constitute an impairment
include compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and disorders resulting
from illegal drug use. See id. § 1630.3(d). The fact that asymptomatic HIV does
not fall under any of these non-disability categories only further bolsters the argu-
ment that HIV infection is an impairment as defined under the ADA because it was
not specifically excluded as were other illnesses.
181. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994).
182. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 125, at D-1.
183. See id. But see Memorandum from Charles J. Cooper, Assistant At-
torney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Ronald E. Robertson, General Counsel
of the Department of Health and Human Services (June 1986), reprinted in DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 122, at D-I (June 25, 1986). This earlier memo by Charles
Cooper made the statement that there is no protection for HIV-positive individuals
under the Rehabilitation Act until those individuals suffer adverse health conse-
quences which may be considered an impairment under the Act. This position has
since been overturned with the publication of the 1988 Department of Justice
memorandum, which takes the opposite position stating that HIV-positive indi-
viduals, even without symptoms, are disabled under the Act. See Kmiec Memo-
randum, supra note 125, at D-2, D-3.
184. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 125, at D-2.
185. See id.
186. Id. Dr. Everett Koop compared impairment of a person in the early
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produces a physiological disorder affecting both the hemic and lym-
phatic bodily systems.8 7 Therefore, Dr. C. Everett Koop and the DOJ
found that "from a purely scientific perspective," asymptomatic indi-
viduals with HIV have a physical impairment under the statute. 88
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit believed that broadening the
protections of the ADA to the plaintiff in Runnebaum would actually be
contrary -to legislative intent.18 9 By applying the plain language defini-
tion of "impairment" as found in the statute, the court found that there
must be "diminishing effects" from a condition.9 According to the
court, the onset of asymptomatic HIV would not cause these diminishing
effects to the individual and thus, there could be no impairment. 9' The
court stated that applying the protections of the ADA to a person who
was not characterized as displaying any "diminishing effects" would
actually tie contrary to Congress' intent. 92 The analysis the court used is
questionable because it completely ignored medical findings of the de-
bilitating effects of the HIV virus to the hemic and lymphatic systems.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit did not believe that there was sufficient
legislative history to give it proper guidance. Although there are com-
mittee reports that include "infection with Human Immunodeficiency
Virus" as; a physical impairment, 193 the reports do not distinguish be-
tween symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV.' 94 However, one can assert
that the committee's use of the phrase "infection with" as opposed to
AIDS or symptomatic HIV arguably shows its intent to include asymp-
tomatic infection.
Alternatively, the court saw no reason to refer to the committee re-
ports because it considered the meaning of "impairment" to be "plain
stages of I1V with that of an individual who has just developed cancer. See id
Even though such an individual may appear fine to most people, he or she is, in
reality, very sick. See id
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 168-69 (4th
Cir. 1997).
190. See id. at 168.
191. See id. Of particular importance in finding no impairment existed is
the fact that asymptomatic HIV is only the initial stages of the infection and a per-
son can remain without symptoms for a significant period-of time. See id.
192. See id.
193. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 551 (1990).
194. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 169.
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and unambiguous."' 95 However, the court did not explain why it was
necessary for it to consult an outside source, a dictionary, in order to
determine the precise meaning of the word "impairment," if the word
was already "plain and unambiguous" on its face. Perhaps, inadver-
tently, the court avoided referring to the committee reports because they
would not support the court's decision.
B. Major Life Activity
Not only must a person have an impairment to be protected under the
ADA, but this impairment must also affect a major life activity.
196
Therefore, it must be determined whether the HIV infection affects any
major life activities of the person who is infected with the virus. 197 The
main argument has been that HIV infection affects reproduction because
of the possibility of transmission to offspring. 198 Additionally, the repro-
duction argument often encompasses intimate sexual relations because
of the possibility that the partner will become infected with the virus.' 99
The EEOC regulations list major life activities, but the list is not ex-
haustive.200 At first glance, the activities listed seem to refer to only such
basic human functions as walking, seeing, speaking, and hearing.20' Yet,
on a reading of the interpretative guidelines to the regulations, other
major life activities which are not as apparent are listed, such as "sitting,
standing, lifting, [and] reaching. 2 Based on the reading of the regula-
tions, in conjunction with the interpretative guidelines, the DOJ deter-
mined that procreation and intimate personal relations are also major life
activities.203 The DOJ's statement, however, did not give a definitive
195. See id. at 168.
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
197. See id
198. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940 (1st Cir. 1997), va-
cated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321
(E.D. Pa. 1994); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. II1.
1994) (holding that an individual is substantially limited in reproduction because of
the risk of transmission of the virus to any offspring).
199. See Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amicus in Support of the Appellant at 10, Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123
F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 94-2200).
200. See 29 C.F.R. § 163 0.2(i) (1998).
201. See id,
202. 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(i).
203. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 125, at D-1.
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answer to this issue, as the DOJ's memo simply stated, "[W]e believe it
is reasonable to conclude,"204 and postulated that it was likely that courts
would find procreation and intimate relations to be major life
activities. 20 5 Because there is no specific list of what constitutes a major
life activity, courts were left on their own to make this determination,
with differing outcomes.0 6
Several courts found reproduction and intimate sexual relations to be
major life: activities under the ADA. 207 In Kohn, Nast & Graf, the court
found that the ADA covered reproduction and intimate sexual relations,
by relying on the non-exhaustive aspect of the EEOC guidelines and
applying a broad interpretation of major life activities. 08 The court ap-
plied a broad interpretation because it found it significant that Congress
used the term "major life activities," as opposed to a narrower descrip-
tion, such as "major work activities. 209 Because Congress intended to
include activities outside of the job context, the court had no difficulty
concluding that reproduction and intimate sexual relations fit within the
purview of major life activities.21
The First Circuit, in Abbott, gave a thorough discussion of whether
reproduction should be a major life activity, including in this group of
activities "intimate sexual activity,.gestation, giving birth, childrearing,
and nurturing familial relations.
"' 211
204. Id. at D-3.
205. See id. at D-2.
206. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940 (1st Cir. 1997), va-
cated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (concluding that reproduction constitutes a major life
activity); Zatarin v. WDSU-Television, Inc. 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995)
(holding that reproduction is not a major life activity because it is not consistent
with the lis;ted activities in the regulations); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F.
Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (stating that reproduction can be a major life
activity for purposes of the ADA).
207. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 940; Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp.
1310, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that "the language of the statute does not pre-
clude procreating as a major life activity, but may well include it.").
208. See Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. at 1320.
209. See id. (emphasis added).
210. See id.
211. Abbott, 107 F.3d at 939.
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In holding that reproduction constitutes a major life activity,212 the court
focused on congressional intent.213 The court first looked to the fact that
procreation is considered a fundamental right in reasoning that Congress
most likely meant to include it in the ADA.214 Next, the court looked to
the dictionary definition of "major," to deduce that the plain meaning of
the word allows reproduction to be an activity included in the ADA.2t 5
The court further reasoned that because the EEOC guidelines defined a
physical impairment to exist when there is a disorder of the reproductive
system, the legislative intent must have been for reproduction to be a
major life activity.216 The court refuted the defendant's argument that
reproduction is not analogous to the listed life activities because it is a
lifestyle choice and it is not engaged in with as much frequency as the
activities listed, such as walking and speaking.217 In rejecting the defen-
dant's argument as unsubstantiated, the court stated that one could make
the same argument about any activity.
2 18
Another view is that reproduction is not a major life activity under the
ADA. 219 This position has been articulated in cases involving women
212. See id. at 941. The court, after giving a strong analysis in favor of
reproduction being covered under the ADA, stated that "the question is very close."
Id. This qualifying statement is difficult to understand considering the court's
strong argument in favor of including reproduction and its firm disagreement with
the defendant's position. See id
213. See id at 939.
214. See id. The court found it likely that Congress recognized the impor-
tance of procreation when it drafted the ADA because procreation is a precious
right. See id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating repro-
duction is a "basic civil right")).
215. See id. at 939-40. "Major" is defined as "greater in dignity, rank,
importance, or interest." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 718
(1989).
216. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 940; see also McWright v. Alexander, 982
F.2d 222, 226 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a person who has a reproductive disor-
der is covered under the Rehabilitation Act); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F.
Supp. 1393, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding in regard to an infertile individual, that
reproduction constitutes a major life activity because the EEOC guidelines provide
that a person has a physical impairment when there is a disorder of the reproductive
system, which leads to the conclusion that reproduction is a major life activity).
217. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941.
218. See id. All activities in which humans engage are, in essence, volun-
tary. Although some people may choose not to speak, like a monk who takes a
vow of silence, there is no question that speaking is a major life activity. See id.
219. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr, 915 F. Supp. 102, 106
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who claimi they have a disability because of infertility, relying on repro-
duction as a major life activity."O In a U.S. District Court decision,
Zatarin v. WDSU-Television, Inc., two arguments were postulated for
the exclusion of reproduction as a major life activity for infertility. First,
the district court stated that the impairment and the life activity should
be separate, so that an individual cannot "bootstrap" the effect of the
major lift: activity onto the impairment.22' Under this theory, an individ-
ual cannot bring an action claiming, for example, that the physical im-
pairment is to his speech organs and the major life activity affected is
speaking. However, this argument is only effective for a claim of infer-
tility and not HIV because the physical impairment for HIV is to the
hemic and lymphatic systems, not the reproductive system.2f
The second argument in Zatarin why reproduction should not qualify
under the ADA is based on the frequency of the activity.22 The court
decided that reproduction is not analogous to the examples of major life
activities provided in the regulations because reproduction is not en-
gaged in as often as the examples, such as walking and speaking, which
a person performs every day.
224
Using a similar analysis, another district court held that reproduction
is not comparable to the list of activities because it involves a lifestyle
choice.225 This argument emphasizes that the activities listed in the
& n.1 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (holding reproduction is not a major life activity for pur-
poses of the, ADA); Zatarin v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240,243 (E.D.
La. 1995). But see Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 170-71 (4th
Cir. 1997) (hesitating to answer the question of whether reproduction and intimate
sexual relations are major life activities).
220. See Zatarin, 881 F. Supp. at 243; Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 106 & n.1
(S.D. Iowa 1995). But see Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404
(N.D. Ill., 1994).
221. See Zatarin, 881 F. Supp. at 243.
222. The bootstrapping argument can be used to support asymptomatic
HIV claims because it shows that Congress intended for reproduction to be a major
life activity. The reasoning for the aforementioned argument is that if reproduction
were not a major life activity, then there would be no need to make the bootstrap-
ping argument at all. See also Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940 (1st Cir.
1997), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (stating that the drafters must have deter-
mined reproduction to be a major life activity because reproductive disorders are
included as a physical impairment).
223. See Zatarin, 881 F. Supp. at 243.
224. See id
225. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106 (S.D.
1998]
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regulations, such as walking and speaking, are performed naturally and
virtually subconsciously unless an individual has a disability.22 The
court concluded that reproduction, on the other hand, is an activity in
which not everyone chooses to engage.
227
However, the latter two arguments are weak, as they can be easily
refuted by reading the listed activity of working. Not everyone chooses
to work, and for some people, the decision to work is a lifestyle
choice. 228 Nevertheless, the Zatarin court vehemently stated, "Treating
reproduction as a major life activity under the ADA would be a con-
scious expansion of the law, which is beyond the province of this
Court."229 The court uses strong language, especially in light of the fact
that the Supreme Court ruled that procreation is a precious fundamental
right.2 0
C. Substantial Limitation
A person must show that the major life activity which is affected by
the impairment is "substantially limited."'' 3 A person is substantially
limited in the performance of an activity when either the person cannot
perform the activity at all, or when the person is "significantly re-
stricted" in his ability to perform as compared to "the average person in
the general population. 232 In interpreting whether a person has been
substantially limited, one should consider such factors as the degree,
duration, and impact of the impairment.
233
Iowa 1995).
226. See id. at 106 & n.1.
227. See id.
228. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 940.
229. Zatarin, 881 F. Supp. at 243.
230. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
232. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (1998). In order to be significantly re-
stricted in a major life activity, the restriction must be in regard to "the condition,
manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average
person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." Id
233. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2). The regulations state the following:
The following factors should be considered in determining
whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activ-ity:-
The nature and severity of the impairment;
The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or
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In holding that a person with asymptomatic HIV is substantially lim-
ited in reproduction and intimate sexual relations, the main considera-
tion has been that a person with HIV has a twenty-five percent risk of
transmitting the disease to a child, as well as a concern of infecting a
partner. 2 4 Individuals with HIV have been warned not to "have unpro-
tected sexual intercourse and are recommended not to have chil-
dren."235 Furthermore, the DOJ agrees that HIV-positive individuals are
substantially limited in reproduction because both males and females
with HIV cannot reproduce with the same expectations for a healthy
child that a person without the HIV virus would have.23
6
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, argued that HIV-positive indi-
viduals are not substantially limited in either reproduction or intimate
sexual relations. 237 Rather, an individual with HIV often makes the con-
scious choice not to have children or to abstain from sexual relations
due to thc risks associated with these activities.28 According to this po-
sition, reproduction is not substantially limited because there is nothing
in the infection that precludes or hinders reproduction and sexual rela-
tions.239 'The language of the ADA requires that it is the impairment
which causes the limitation, not "the individual's reaction to the im-
pairment." 240 While it is true that an individual may be limited in pro-
creation or sexual relations arising out of a conscious decision, the
Fourth Circuit did not consider that an individual is substantially limited
because (f the possible transmission of the virus to a child or a partner.
Although a person with HIV may decide to abstain from having chil-
long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.
Id.
234. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
235. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Whitman-Walker Clinic Legal Services De-
partment, at 20, Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997)
(No. 94-2200) (citing State v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992)).
236. See Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 125, at D-3.
237. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 172.
238. See id.
239. See id. An example of an impairment that actually causes the sub-
stantial limitation would be the loss of the ability to walk due to paralysis. The
court asserts that HIV, in contrast, does not itself prevent any activity, but rather it
is the knowledge that a person carries the HIV infection which causes him or her to
possibly refrain from reproduction and sexual relations. See id.
240. Id.
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dren or engaging in intimate sexual relations, this is not necessarily a
voluntary decision. Rather, this abstention is, in essence, mandatory
because of the high risk of passing on this possibly fatal illness to an-
other and the moral overtones associated with taking such a chance. Al-
ternatively, if a person were to reproduce, the twenty-five percent risk of
transmission is itself a substantial limitation.
. An analysis of the legislative history of the ADA may also provide
clues as to whether Congress intended to include individuals with
asymptomatic HIV in the class protected by the ADA as well. Commit-
tee reports and statements made by members of Congress'regarding the
enactment of the ADA also contain the legislative intent of Congress. In
Kohn, Nast & Graf, the court supported its analysis by statements made
by Congressmen Owens (D-New York) and Waxman (D-California)
indicating their convictions that the provisions of the Act protect a per-
son who has HIV, even if there are no visible symptoms.241 Both mem-
bers believed that HIV is only the initial stage in a "continuum of. dis-
ease among those who are HIV infected," ranging from asymptomatic
HIV to full-blown AIDS.242
D. Case-By-Case Analysis or Per Se Disability?
Another consideration for an ADA claim is whether a condition is a
per se disability or whether courts should perform case-by-case analysis
to determine if that individual meets the criteria for a disability.243 There
was disagreement over whether HIV can be a per se disability or must
241. See Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. 1310,1320 n.7 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
242. Id. at 1320 & n.7. Congressman Owens (D-New York), in discussing
whether someone in the early stages of HIV is covered stated, "People with HIV
disease are individuals who have any condition along the full spectrum of HIV
infection-asymptomatic HIV infection, symptomatic HIV infection or full blown
AIDS. These individuals are covered under the first prong of the definition of dis-
ability in the ADA .... ." 136 CONG. REc. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990). Con-
gressman Waxman (D-California) similarly stated, "As medical knowledge has
increased, specialists in the field increasingly recognize that there exists a contin-
uum of disease among those who are HIV infected. All such individuals are cov-
ered under the first prong of the definition of disability in the ADA." 136 CONG.
REC. H4646 (daily ed. July 12, 1990).
243. See Hernandez v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 977 F. Supp. 1160,
1163 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
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be determined on an individualized basis.244 Subsequent to the Ennis
decision, the Fourth Circuit held that the ADA's definition of a disabil-
ity requires the judiciary to make its inquiry on an "individualized ba-
sis. ', 245 Because the provision in the statute consistently refers to "indi-
vidual," whether a person with HIV has a disability must be determined
by this individualized method.246 The court based its decision on the
premise that a condition may not affect everyone in the same way.247
Certain factors may play a role in how a condition affects an individual,
such as the existence of other impairments that contribute to the effect
of the condition.24' There are certain impairments, however, that will be
substantially limiting on every individual because of the nature of the
impairment, such as blindness and deafness.249 District courts have
found that: HIV and AIDS are included in the conditions which are con-
sidered per se disabilities.250 The argument that HIV is included as a per
se disability is bolstered by the interpretative guidelines to the EEOC
regulations which state that HIV is an "inherently substantially limiting"
impairment.
251
Although some courts specifically held that a case-by-case analysis
should be used to determine whether a person has a disability, the result
of the courts' analyses have, nevertheless, implicated that HIV is a per
se disabiljity.252 The First Circuit is a good example. Although the First
244. See id. (stating that "[i]t is unsettled whether HIV and AIDS are per
se disabilities.").
245. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 166 (4th Cir.
1997).
246. See Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. and Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59 (4th
Cir. 1995).
247. See 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2(j) (1998).
248. See i d
249. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Whitman-Walker Clinic Legal Services
Department, at 17, Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir.
1997) (No. 94-2200).
250. See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Del., 924 F. Supp 763,
774-75 (E.D. Tex. 1996). "Conditions such as AIDS, HIV, blindness, and deaf-
ness, inter alia, have been determined by the courts to be per se disabilities." Id.
(citing, inter alia, Robertson v. Granite City Comm. Unit School District, 684 F.
Supp. 1002, 1006-07 (S.D. Ill. 1988); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 3, at 18 n.18 (1990)).
251. See 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2().
252. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997), va-
cated, 1 18 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp 1310, 1321
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Circuit stated that an "individualized inquiry" is required to determine
an actual disability, 253 it continued, "We thus hold that HIV-positive
status is a physical impairment that substantially limits a fecund
woman's major life activity of reproduction. 254 The First Circuit noted
that this decision is consistent with the legislative intent of the ADA that
it should protect HIV-positive individuals. 255 Both of these statements
lead the reader to the conclusion that the First Circuit made HIV a per se
disability. In fact, HIV status should be a per se disability because, un-
like some disorders, HIV affects all its victims in the same way, sub-
stantially limiting them in their ability to procreate.
E. "Regarded As" Prong
Should a court not be persuaded that an individual has an actual dis-
ability as defined in the ADA, the plaintiff has yet another possible path
to secure ADA protection. The third prong of the definition of a disabil-
ity states that a person has a disability if he or she is regarded as having
an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 25 6 The Su-
preme Court decision in Arline made it clear that the Rehabilitation Act
may protect an individual who suffers from a symptomatic contagious
illness when that individual is regarded as being disabled.257 Even
though the Supreme Court declined to consider whether asymptomatic
infection, such as HIV, could render a person disabled under the Act, it
is logical to conclude that an asymptomatic individual with a contagious
disease, like a symptomatic individual, may have a disability.258 The
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding, in effect, that HIV is a per se disability).
253. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941 (stating that the first subsection under the
definition of a disability requires an individualized inquiry).
254. Id at 942.
255. See id. at 942-43.
256. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(a), (c) (1994).
257. See Kushen, supra note 73, at 567. The Supreme Court's decision in
Arline was incorporated into the ADA under the perceived disability in Section
12102(c). See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Whitman-Walker Clinic Legal Services
Department, at 9, Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997)
(No. 94-2200).
258. See, Kushen, supra note 73, at 567. In discussing the question of
whether an asymptomatic individual is covered, the court stated:
This case does not present, and we therefore do not reach, the
questions whether a carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS
could be considered to have a physical impairment, or whether
such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of the con-
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Supreme Court premised its finding that an individual can be disabled
when he has a symptomatic contagious disease on the consideration that
negative attitudes from other people could be so disabling that they sub-
stantially limit one's ability to interact with others and work. 9 This
rationale would seem to apply to all contagious diseases, whether or not
there were any actual impairments associated with the illness.
260
The Ari'ine decision was extended in the Rehabilitation Act context in
several circuits, not only to a teacher who had full-blown AIDS,26' but
also to individuals who are HIV-positive.262 However, at issue is
whether these circuits have misinterpreted the "regarded as" prong. In
Gates, the: Ninth Circuit held that, following Arline, there was no differ-
ence between full-blown AIDS and asymptomatic HIV for deciding
whether a person is regarded as having a disability. 263 The court's analy-
sis was questionable. The Ninth Circuit stated that it is the contagious
effect of the condition which renders a person disabled in this situation,
so that logically, it is irrelevant whether the individual has any visible
symptoms;. 2 The Ninth Circuit deduced that because a person who is
HIV-positive has a contagious infection, he or she is disabled under the
"regarded as" subsection.26 5 However, the purpose of this prong is to
take into consideration the impact of other people's perceptions. If an
individual. is considered disabled under the "regarded as" prong without
consideration of his or her particular situation, the whole purpose of the
prong is defeated.
In contrast to the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the Fourth Circuit took
a case-by.-case view of the "regarded as" prong.266 Where the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits found that a person is regarded as disabled when he
has a contagious illness without any further inquiry, the Fourth Circuit
tagi ousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act.
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 n.7 (1987).
259. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 283.
260. See Kushen, supra note 73, at 567.
261. See Chalk v. United States, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
262. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994); Harris v.
Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522-24 (11th Cir. 1991).
263. See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446. In Gates, the plaintiffs were segregated
from other inmates and denied access to certain programs because they were HIV-
positive. See id.
264. See Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446.
265. See id.
266. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir.
1997).
19981
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stressed that one must focus on the perceptions of the particular people
working with the HIV-positive individual. 67 The Fourth Circuit is in
accordance with the purpose of the third prong in that if the plaintiff is
unable to prove his co-workers perceived him or her as having an im-
pairment which substantially limits a major life activity, then he is not
"regarded as" disabled. 68
In sum, the circuits are in conflict over the interpretation of the "re-
garded as" prong. Some courts view HIV as a per se disability because
of the contagious effects of the condition which render the person "re-
garded as" disabled. Other courts, however, seem to adhere closer to the
wording of the statute and to determine the effects of individuals' reac-
tions by looking to the claimant's situation.
IV. COMMENT: IS AN ASYMPTOMATIC INDIVIDUAL
WITH HIV DISABLED?
With the confusion and disagreement surrounding the question of
whether an asymptomatic HIV individual is protected by the ADA, the
Supreme Court's decision to hear arguments in the Bragdon case was to
clarify the issue and to promote uniform application of the ADA. Close
consideration of this issue is imperative because it is important that the
ADA should apply to those for whom it was intended, while at the same
time, "every addition broadens the scope of the ADA's protected class,
creating the potential for innumerable additional claims." 2 9 In deter-
mining the existence of a disability, it is essential to rely on the plain
language of the statute, the corresponding regulations providing guid-
ance on interpretation, and legislative intent. Based on this analysis, it is
logical to conclude, irrespective of the Supreme Court's ruling, that in-
dividuals with asymptomatic HIV are disabled under the ADA.
The language of the statute and the EEOC regulations alone lead to
the conclusion that an HIV-positive individual, regardless of physical
symptoms, is disabled under the ADA. HIV is a physical impairment as
it is a physiological disorder which affects both the hemic and lymphatic
bodily systems by the very nature of the infection.27 0 The fact that the
DOJ lists both symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV as impairments
267. See id at 172.
268. See id. at 173.
269. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council, at
10, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (No. 97-156).
270. See Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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strengthens this conclusion.2 7 1 The Fourth Circuit had no need to look
beyond the regulations to dictionaries because the regulations are more
specific to the ADA. In addition, HIV infection should meet the Fourth
Circuit's definition of "impairment" as a deterioration because the in-
fection "penetrates and then disables white blood cells that normally
check the growth of parasitic infections in the body. 272
Secondly, the HIV infection affects the major life activities of repro-
duction and intimate sexual relations. Even though the regulations do
not list reproduction and sexual relations, this list is not exhaustive. 273 It
has been argued that reproduction and sexual relations are not analogous
to the activities listed because people do not engage in sexual relations
and reproduction with the same frequency as the activities listed, and
that sexual relations and reproduction are lifestyle choices.7 Both of
these arguments may easily be refuted. Nowhere in the statute or regu-
lations does it state that the activity must be performed often or by eve-
ryone. The only requirement is that the activity be "major.,
275
Reproduction fits into the category of major life activities. 7 6 It is a
basic fundamental activity necessary for the existence of the human spe-
cies, which is evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court stated it to
be a "basic civil right." 277 Not only is reproduction necessary to keep our
population from disappearing, it is also an essential element of the basic
family unit, the building block of our society. The family provides the
necessary emotional support and strength for an individual to prosper.
Furthermore, the family unit has also been essential to the advancement
271. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998).
272. Cain, 734 F. Supp. at 679.
273. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
274. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106 (S.D.
Iowa 1995); Zatarin v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La.
1995).
275. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940-41 (1st Cir. 1997), va-
cated, 118:S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
276. See id at 940. The other argument expressed as to why reproduction
should not be considered a major life activity is usually held in the infertility con-
text when plaintiffs argue that since a disorder with the reproductive system is gen-
erally considered to be an impairment, reproduction should necessarily be a major
life activity. This argument has been rejected because it is bootstrapping the im-
pairment to the major life activity. See Zatarin, 881 F. Supp. at 243. However,
this is not en issue for HIV individuals, because the bodily systems affected are the
hemic and lymphatic systems. See id at 243.
277. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
1998]
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of humankind. In early times, the human beings who thrived were the
ones who lived and worked together. Therefore, because reproduction is
the building block of the family structure and family is of such signifi-
cance, reproduction is a major life activity.
There may be concern that including reproduction as a major life ac-
tivity will open the door to numerous reproductive disability claims un-
der the ADA, claims which may not be as meritorious as claims brought
by HIV-positive individuals. Recognizing these additional claims may
interpret the statute as overly broad and frustrate Congress' intent.
278
However, not all conditions. are per se disabilities and often, the deter-
mination of whether an individual has a disability under the ADA will
be made on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, if the physical impair-
ment is related to the reproductive system, as with infertility and impo-
tence, a court of appeals has held that the major life activity cannot be
reproduction because this would be "bootstrapping" the major life ac-
tivity onto the impairment.279 Finally, due to the ever-changing techno-
logical developments today, infertility can often be overcome.
Lastly, by relying on the factors listed in the regulations, one can
make a legally sound conclusion that reproduction is substantially lim-
ited when an individual has the HIV infection. 280 The Fourth Circuit's
argument that it is not the actual virus which substantially limits pro-
creation, but rather a person's conscious decision to refrain from repro-
duction and sexual relations, is misguided. 28 1 As noted earlier, the sub-
stantial limitation on reproduction is the result of the risk of producing
offspring who are also infected with the virus.28 2 An HIV-positive indi-
vidual has an eight percent risk of transmission with medication, which
rises to a twenty-five percent risk without medication.8 3 Even if one
only considers the eight percent risk, this substantially limits an individ-
278. Differentiating strictly reproductive disability claims from asympto-
matic HIV under the ADA is an important consideration because it is estimated that
there are approximately forty-nine million women in childbearing years who are
infertile in the United States alone. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit at 9 (No. 97-156).
279. See Zatarin, 881 F. Supp at 243.
280. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (1998).
281. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 171 (4th Cir.
1997).
282. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated,
118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
283. See id
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ual. The individual is significantly restricted in his or her ability to pro-
create compared to the rest of the population, as required in the regula-
tions.2U
Furthermore, intimate sexual relations is a major life activity because
it is one cf the closest interactions two people can have. The basis for
such an ac-tivity is interaction with others. For this reason, it is analo-
gous to ot:her activities enumerated in the EEOC regulations, such as
working and talking, which also involve interaction.85 Sexual activity is
substantia'Ily limited because unprotected sexual intercourse carries the
risk of infecting the partner. Additionally, as discussed above, protection
during sexual intercourse is, in a sense, mandatory for HIV-positive in-
dividuals because of the moral overtones associated with potentially
exposing an individual to the illness.
Even if reproduction and intimate sexual relations are not major life
activities, there are several other activities which HIV affects that may
be considered major life activities. One such activity is traveling.286 A
person wilh HIV is limited in his ability to travel because of the risk of
contracting bacterial infections.28 7 Additionally, some foreign countries
require vaccines that may be dangerous to HIV-positive individuals.2 8
Traveling is also limited because asymptomatic individuals are often on
drug regiraens which require them to stay close to their physicians.
28 9
Furthermore, the life activity of "caring for oneself" is affected because
persons with HIV need to see physicians more frequently.
290
Even though a person with HIV falls under the first prong of the defi-
nition of disability under the ADA, the question of whether such a per-
son falls utnder the third prong, also known as the "regarded as" prong,
is not as clear. Although the Supreme Court's analysis in Arline suggests
284. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
285. See id. § 1630.2(i).
286. See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Del., 924 F. Supp. 763,
777 n.37 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
287. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Whitman-Walker Clinic Legal Services
Department, at 23, Runnebam v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir.
1997) (No. 94-2200) (citing Anderson, 924 F. Supp. at 777 n.37 (E.D. Tex. 1996)).
288. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Whitman-Walker Clinic Legal Services
Department, at 23, Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 .(4th Cir.
1997) (No. 94-2200).
289. See id.
290. See Hernandez v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 977 F. Supp. 1160,
1164 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
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that a person with a contagious symptomatic disease may be disabled
because he or she is perceived as having a disability, 29' the court did not
lay down a per se rule. The Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme
Court's analysis when it stated in Gates that it is the contagiousness of a
condition which is the basis for a disability.292 Rather, the Fourth Circuit
was correct in holding that in order to find a person with HIV disabled
under the perceived disability prong, the analysis must focus on the
particular employer involved and his personal perceptions regarding the
contagiousness of an illness.
293
It is now well-known that the HIV virus can only be transmitted
through bodily fluids, not through casual contact alone. Society does not
have the "level of public fear and misapprehension" as it once did about
HIV.294 A person cannot argue that simply because someone is aware of
an individual's HIV status, that he or she perceived that individual as
disabled.295 It is less likely that for HIV-positive individual to be per-
ceived as disabled than a person with a highly contagious disease, such
as hepatitis or tuberculosis. With asymptomatic HIV, the individual
must prove that the surrounding individuals are aware of his or her con-
dition. Furthermore, people must view the individual as not only carry-
ing an infectious disease, but also being substantially limited in a major
life activity. Proving the individual is regarded as substantially limited
in a major life activity is especially difficult when an asymptomatic
condition is involved. Unlike a symptomatic contagious disease, in
which the illness is apparent and people may view the condition as inter-
fering with daily activities, it is less likely that people will view an
asymptomatic illness as interfering with any major life activities. Al-
though an HIV-positive individual may be able to succeed under the
"regarded as" prong, the individual may have difficulty showing that in
the particular situation, he or she was perceived as having an impairment
that substantially limited a major life activity.
Lastly, due to the inherently substantially limiting nature of the virus
and the legislative history commenting on this disease, HIV status, both
291. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283
(1987).
292. See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994).
293. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir.
1997).
294. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
295. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 172.
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symptomatic and asymptomatic, should be a per se disability. Unlike
other impairments which may affect people differently, the HIV infec-
tion substantially limits everyone, so no individualized inquiry is neces-
sary. 296 Th- age of the individual should not pose a barrier to a per se
rule. A young child is disabled because he or she is substantially limited
in reproduction, even if the child has not yet gained the capability to
reproduce. On the other hand, an older woman in today's society is still
capable of reproducing long after she has experienced menopause be,
cause of advanced medical technology, such as in vitro fertilization. The
Fourth Circ:uit claimed there must be a case-by-case determination, but
in essence, it established a per se rule that an individual with asympto-
matic HIV is not disabled under the ADA by holding that such a person
does not even have an impairment.297 In addition, legislative history
supports the per se rule with statements such as those made by U.S.
House Representatives and the DOJ memorandum. 298 This legislative
history shows that Congress intended for asymptomatic HIV to be a dis-
ability. Therefore, it should be a per se rule that a person with asympto-
matic HIV is disabled under the ADA because he or she has a physical
impairment which substantially limits a major life activity.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the ADA is to protect persons with disabilities from
discrimina:ion. 299 A main issue that surfaced since the ADA's enactment
is exactly what constitutes a disability. Recently, there has been concern
about reading the statute overbroadly and extending coverage to persons
whom were not intended to be protected under the Act. This concern
extends to asymptomatic individuals with HIV because the number of
ADA clains brought by such individuals is increasing. This is due to the
fact that the number of individuals with the HIV virus continues to
rise.3°° At the same time, the nature of the illness has changed to the
296. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Whitman-Walker Clinic Legal Services
Department, at 17, Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir.
1997) (No. 94-2200).
297. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 176 (Michael, C.J., dissenting).
298. See, e.g., Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1320 n.7
(E.D. Pa. 1994); Kmiec Memorandum, supra note 125, at D-2, D-3 (stating that
asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the ADA).
299. See PARRY, supra note 2, at 2.
300. There are over 230,000 Americans who have HIV and it is estimated
that the number of persons affected in North America will be over one million by
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extent that an individual may live for ten years or longer before any
physical symptoms begin to appear. The concern relating to broadening
the protections of the ADA is exemplified in the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Runnebaum, where the court held that the HIV-positive plaintiff
was not disabled a.3 0 However, by reading the plain language of the ADA
and referring to the EEOC and the DOJ regulations, as well as the leg-
islative history, one must deduce that an individual with the HIV virus,
even in the early stages of the disease, without outward symptoms, has a
disability under the Act. An individual has a physical impairment from
the nature of the virus, and he or she is substantially limited in repro-
duction and intimate sexual relations because there is a risk of passing
on the virus to a partner and any offspring. A senior attorney with the
EEOC,30 2 speaking at a conference on HIV/AIDS, viewed the Fourth
Circuit's holding with skepticism, when he said,
Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a
fractured August decision, held that asymptomatic HIV is not a
disability under the ADA, employers would be "foolish" to rely
upon that case .... When in doubt, treat HIV-positive employ-
ees or employees with AIDS as having an ADA-recognized dis-
ability, to avoid problems down the road. 0 a
Not only can an individual with HIV be disabled under the ADA, but
infection with the HIV virus should be a per se disability because HIV is
a potentially fatal illness which is "inherently substantially limiting."
3°4
Thus, the Supreme Court, in its analysis, came to the correct decision
that the ADA provides to all HIV-positive individuals the same protec-
tion against discrimination as persons who are disabled "in the usual,
common, lay sense of the word. 30 5
2000. See DAVID M. STUDDERT & TROYEN A. BRENNAN, HIV Infection and the
Americans with Disabilities Act: An Evolving Interaction, 549 THE ANNALS OF
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 84, 85 (Alan W.
Heston & Neil A. Weiner eds., 1997).
301. See Runnebaum, 123 F.3d at 174.
302. Peter Petesch, an attorney for the EEOC, spoke at the National Busi-
ness and Labor Conference on HIV/AIDS in September 1997. AIDS: Jumble of
Laws Affecting HIV Are Examined During CDC Conference, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 190, at A-3 (Oct. 1, 1997).
303. Id.
304. See 29 C.F.R. App. § 1630.2() (1998).
305. Doe v. Kohn, Nast, & Graf, 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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EPILOGUE
Section 12101(b) of the ADA states that a purpose of this statute is
"to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimi-
nation of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."3" 6 The
Supreme Court of the United States was instrumental in effecting the
aforementioned goal articulated by Congress when the Court rendered
the landmark decision of Bragdon v. Abbott3 07 on June 25, 1998. Brag-
don was siignificant because it extended the protections of the ADA to
individuals with the HIV virus.30 8 The Court ruled that the respondent,
an HIV-positive individual who had no symptoms during the time at
issue, pos;essed a disability under section 12102(2)(A) of the ADA,
thereby qualifying for protection under the Act.30 9 The Court determined
that the respondent was, in fact, "disabled" because she had a physical
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.
310
In reaching its conclusion that an asymptomatic individual with HIV
has a disability under the ADA, the Court considered each of the three
subsections of Section 12102(2)(A) separately: (1) physical impairment;
(2) major life activity; and, (3) substantial limitation.31 1 First, the Court
found the respondent, Ms. Abbott, to have a physical impairment of the
hemic and lymphatic systems from the time she initially contracted HIV
due to the "immediacy with which the virus begins to damage the in-
fected person's white blood cells and the severity of the disease."
312
Second, the Court determined that reproduction is a major life activity
306. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
307. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). This case involved a dentist who refused to
treat a patient in his office because she was HIV-positive. See id. at 2201.
308. See Joan Biskupic & Amy Goldstein, Disability Law Covers HIV,
Justices HoM, WASH. POST, June 26, 1998, at Al.
309. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201. This was the first ruling by the
Supreme Court involving the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bisku-
pic & Goldstein, supra note 308, at Al.
310. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2204. Note that the third question pre-
sented to the Court involving whether the respondent posed a direct threat to the
dentist, which would allow the dentist to refuse to treat the patient under the provi-
sions of the ADA, has been remanded back to the First Circuit. See id at 2213.
The First Circuit must examine this issue more thoroughly in light of the Supreme
Court's analysis of sources upon which the First Circuit relied. See id
311. See id. at 2202.
312. Id. at 2204.
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under the ADA.313 The defendant dentist argued that the ability to repro-
duce and bear children cannot be a major life activity under the ADA
because it does not have "a public, economic, or daily character. 
3 14
However, the Court was persuaded that reproduction is analogous to
other major life activities listed in agency regulations, including work-
ing and learning.1 5 In addition, the Court stated that reproduction is the
major life activity considered because that is what the respondent raised
in supporting her ADA claim.316 However, the Court did not rule out any
other major life activities, as it stated, "Given the pervasive, and in-
variably fatal, course of the disease, its effect on major life activities of
many sorts might have been relevant to our inquiry. 317
Third, the Court looked to medical evidence to determine that an
HIV-infected individual is substantially limited in the ability to repro-
duce. 318 The substantial limitation requirement found in the third sub-
section of section 12102(2)(A) is satisfied because a person's ability to
reproduce is limited in two ways. First, the Court concluded that an in-
fected female may transmit the virus to a male with whom she has sex-
ual relations. 3 9 Second, an HIV-positive female also may transmit the
HIV virus to her unborn child. 320 The Court's finding that the risk to a
male partner substantially limits an infected female is particularly sig-
nificant because it indicates that the Court included intimate sexual re-
lations as encompassed in the reproduction process. In support of its
decision based on the definition of a disability, the Court looked to
agency regulations that find asymptomatic HIV to be a "disability"
within the meaning of the ADA.32'
Also of significance, the Court stated that in view of its holding, it
would not address the second question of whether HIV infection itself is
a per se disability.3 22 The Court's holding, coupled with the fact that the
virus attacks all individuals in the same way, leads one to believe that
asymptomatic HIV is a disability for all individuals infected with the
313. Seeid. at 2205.
314. Id.
315. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
316. See id.
317. Id. at 2204-05.
318. Seeid at2206.
319. See id.
320. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
321. See id. at 2205.
322. See id. at 2207.
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illness, without a need for a case-by-case determination.
The effefts of the Court's decision in Bragdon will be life-changing
to some, and will extend to a substantial portion of our country's soci-
ety. The most obvious groups affected by the ruling are the 525,000 in-
dividuals in the United States with asymptomatic HIV,323 as well as
those who must abide by the statute. Public and private entities, includ-
ing employers and places of public accommodations, such as doctors'
offices, hospitals, schools, and restaurants, cannot discriminate against
individuals with HIV due to their infection with the virus.3 24 The ADA
mandates that reasonable accommodations, if necessary, must be made
for individuals with HIV,321 such as allowing an employee to modify his
or her work schedule for a periodic doctor's appointment. Because the
Court deteimined that reproduction is a major life activity, the ADA
may provide protections to those with solely reproductive disorders,
such as infertility, provided that the individual meets the three subsec-
tions of seciion 12102(2)(A).326
The benefits associated with the Supreme Court's ruling extend be-
yond those entities bound by the ADA. As a result of the Bragdon deci-
sion, individuals may feel less hesitant about submitting to testing for
the HIV virus because now they can feel confident that, if they are HIV-
positive, they are protected from discrimination by the ADA. 27 Infected
individuals may not be terminated from employment or evicted from
their homes as a result of a positive HIV test.328 Once individuals are
aware they have HIV, they can receive medical care and assist in pre-
venting the spread of the virus. The Court's acknowledgement that the
HIV virus itself is a disability may play a role in a future decision by the
federal government that HIV-positive individuals qualify for
323. See Justin Gillis, Ruling Shows How Far Nation Has Evolved on Epi-
demic, WASH. POST, June 26, 1998, at A16.
324. S ee 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12132, 12182 (1994). Because the Court
was interpreting the definition of the term "disability" in the general provisions of
the ADA, the ruling, although in the context of public accommodations under Title
III, has the sane impact on all other titles of theAct. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
325. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12112, 12131-12132; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A) (referring to making "reasonable modifications").
326. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit at 9 (No. 97-156).
327. See Biskupic & Goldstein, supra note 308, at A17.
328. :3ee id.
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Medicaid.329
For those who are concerned with broadening the parameters of pro-
tection under the ADA, it is.important to keep in mind that merely hav-
ing a disability is not sufficient to litigate a successful claim under the
ADA. A successful discrimination claim requires the plaintiff to estab-
lish both that he is disabled and that he was unlawfully discriminated
against.330 Therefore, provided an employer does not discriminate
against a disabled employee, that employer can successfully defend
against an ADA discrimination claim.
Christine Spinella Davis
329. See id.
330. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 164 (4th Cir.
1997).
